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I. INTRODUCTION
Legalizing medical marijuana is an increasing trend. Most states
have enacted medical marijuana laws that allow for the growth, use, and
distribution of marijuana for medical purposes.1 Of the fifty states in the
Union, thirty-three of them and the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico,
and the U.S. Virgin Islands have approved comprehensive public medical
marijuana or cannabis programs.2 Although apparently legal to possess and
use marijuana under these laws, they still in conflict with and, therefore,
illegal under federal law.3 Congress classified marijuana in Schedule I of the
Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”) because it is considered to have “no
currently accepted medical use . . . .”4 However, medical research on the
positive effects of marijuana, and the current trend of recognizing and
embracing these positive effects, has certainly opened the floodgates for states
wishing to legalize marijuana for medical use.5 These medical marijuana laws
differ considerably in their scope and implementation, including the
regulation of dispensaries. For example, some states only allow access to
marijuana use to terminally ill patients, while others are much less restrictive.6
The focus of this Article will be on how states regulate legalized
medical marijuana, and the impact that regulation has had on social justice.
Evidence suggests that medical marijuana legalization and regulation is
essentially successful and now overwhelmingly supported by 64% of
Americans.7 This Article also explores what is, or should be, the optimal
structure for medical marijuana regulation. Several other questions remain
unanswered. Should a state allow one person or organization to produce,
process, and sell marijuana? Should vertical integration—meaning those who
wish to sell marijuana must also grow it, and those who wish to grow
marijuana must also sell it—be optional; a mandatory requirement; or even
be a part of a hybrid regulatory scheme?8
1
See State Medical Marijuana Laws, NCSL (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/
state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx.
2
Id. Eleven states—Alaska, California, Colorado, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington—plus the District of Columbia have passed laws that permit
recreational sales of marijuana. See id. In the same vein, twenty-one states allow for some form of medical
marijuana, while sixteen states allow for a lesser type of medical marijuana extract. Ryan Struyk,
Marijuana Legalization by the Numbers, CNN (Mar. 30, 2018, 1:35 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/
04/politics/marijuana-legalization-by-the-numbers/index.html.
3
See Struyk, supra note 2.
4
21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B), (c). This means the CSA criminalizes marijuana as a controlled substance
and, consequently, it is illegal to sell, manufacture, distribute or dispense the drug in any form. See 21
U.S.C. § 812(c); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
5
See Florence Shu-Acquaye, Rohrabacher-Blumenauer Amendment, Case Law and the Department
of Justice: Who Prevails in the Medical Marijuana Legalization Debate, 54 GONZ. L. REV. 127, 128
(2018).
6
See State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 1.
7
Struyk, supra note 2.
8
Will Kenton, Vertical Integration, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/vertical
integration.asp (June 14, 2020); Lael Henterly, The Vertical Integration Debate, MARIJUANA VENTURE
(April 18, 2016), https://www.marijuanaventure.com/vertical-integration-debate/.
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It has been suggested that “[s]tates should keep the production and
retail sales of marijuana separate to ensure that the industry does not evolve
into a group of politically and financially powerful vertically integrated
businesses.”9 The vertical model is widely criticized, as it could be very
expensive and challenging to open many operations at the same time.10
Likewise, the different operational facets would require different skill sets,
which itself could be challenging.11 Even if a business were in a position to
expand under the vertical approach, it would likely affect the “mom-and-pop”
businesses by putting them out of business, as they will be at a competitive
disadvantage.12
States employ a variety of regulations and license structures, each one
different from the next and stands out in its own way. Although these
regulations are still relatively new, as marijuana legalization is a recent
phenomenon, this Article will examine all the different regulations as a whole
to see the likely effectiveness and rationale for them. Examining and
analyzing these regulations could be helpful in understanding the likely
impact they could have over the years.13
This Article will examine the strengths and shortcomings the
different regulatory systems may engender and what lessons can be learned
from the states that have implemented one form or the other. Florida’s system
is vertically integrated, but Colorado dropped a similar system shortly after
implementing it.14 Therefore, it was not surprising that Florida lawmakers
solicited help from Colorado lawmakers to understand vertical integration and
the lessons they learned from implementing it.15 For this reason, this Article
is placed in the context of marijuana law in Florida and will delve into the
issue of whether a 2017 law that banned patients from smoking medical
marijuana runs against a 2016 constitutional amendment that broadly
legalized marijuana.16 This Article will closely examine the burning issues in
Florida’s medical marijuana legalization, namely those surrounding who gets
to grow and sell marijuana. Lawmakers approved a limited number of
companies to do so, supposedly for security reasons, but this has been
criticized in that the state licensed growers are now seen as more of a cartel,

9
Vikas Bajaj, Rules for the Marijuana Market, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com
/2014/08/05/opinion/high-time-rules-for-the-marijuana-market.html?auth=login-email&login=email.
10
See Henterly, supra note 8.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
See id.
14
Nick Evans, FL House Lawmakers Seek Advice from Colorado on Cannabis, WFSU PUB. MEDIA
(Jan. 25, 2017, 6:00 PM), http://news.wfsu.org/post/fl-house-lawmakers-seek-advice-colorado-cannabis.
15
See id.
16
Dara Kam, Repeal of Florida’s Ban on Smokable Medical Marijuana Heads to the Governor’s
Desk, ORLANDO WKLY. (Mar. 14, 2019, 10:45 AM), https://www.orlandoweekly.com/Blogs/archives/
2019/03/14/repeal-of-floridas-ban-on-smokable-medical-marijuana-heads-to-the-governors-desk.
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rather than a state approved entity.17
II. OVERVIEW OF MARIJUANA REGULATION
Although once legal to grow and use marijuana under state and
federal law, American regulation started in the 1910s when some states took
the initiative to criminalize marijuana.18 This period ushered in strong feelings
against the acceptance of marijuana in America.19 As a result, states started
to pass laws prohibiting marijuana use.20 Utah was the first to do so, and nine
others quickly followed suit.21 Between 1920 and 1930, marijuana was
heavily associated with crime by Black and Latino migrant workers.22 As
these individuals moved across the country, so too did the spread of
prohibiting marijuana.23
Federal regulation of marijuana soon followed the state’s efforts to
regulate marijuana. In 1915, President Woodrow Wilson signed the Harrison
Act, and it became a model for future drug regulations.24 The Harrison Act
implemented a system for placing serial numbers on medications and required
physicians who wanted to prescribe opiates to register with the federal
government.25 The Harrison Act became the basis for the federal
government’s first marijuana regulation: The Marijuana Tax Act of 1937
(“Marijuana Tax Act”).26
The Marijuana Tax Act made it illegal to possess marijuana in the
United States, except for medical or industrial use, and was passed to curtail

17

Evans, supra note 14.
Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV.
74, 81 (2015).
19
See Dale H. Gieringer, The Forgotten Origins of Cannabis Prohibition in California, 26 CONTEMP.
DRUG PROBS. 237 (1999).
20
Cherminsky et al., supra note 18, at 81.
21
Florence Shu-Acquaye, The Role of States in Shaping the Legal Debate on Medical Marijuana, 42
MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 697, 705 (2016); see also Pete Guither, Why is Marijuana Illegal?, DRUG
WAR RANT, http://www.drugwarrant.com/articles/why-is-marijuana-illegal (last visited Dec. 2, 2020)
(“[I]ncluding Wyoming (1915), Texas (1919), Iowa (1923), Nevada (1923), Oregon (1923), Washington
(1923), Arkansas (1923), and Nebraska (1927).”).
22
Chemerinsky et al., supra note 18, at 81.
23
Id. at 82. Criminalization of marijuana, like with cocaine and opiates, was a result of “racialized
perceptions” that users of color endangered public safety. Steven W. Bender, The Colors of Cannabis:
Race and Marijuana, 50 UCLA L. REV. 689, 690 (2016) [hereinafter Bender, The Colors of Cannabis].
Consequently, state and local governments proceeded to ban its usage, especially in states with heavy
Mexican populations. Id. In fact, this racialized profiling is evidenced by a statement made in the early
1900s in the Texas Senate that “[a]ll Mexicans are crazy, and this [marijuana] is what makes them crazy.”
Id. (quoting 1927 New York Times article). While in Southern states, where there are high black
populations, marijuana laws were also propelled by prejudice, as marijuana was considered the catalyst for
“murder, rape, and mayhem amongst blacks.” Steven W. Bender, Joint Reform?: The Interplay of State,
Federal, and Hemispheric Regulation of Recreational Marijuana and the Failed War on Drugs, 6 ALB.
GOV’T L. REV. 359, 362 (2013).
24
Shu-Acquaye, supra note 21, at 705.
25
Id. at 705–06.
26
Id. at 706–07.
18
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marijuana trafficking by implementing high taxes.27 So, although the
Marijuana Tax Act did not make the use of medical marijuana illegal, the high
taxes made it expensive.28 Finally, the Marijuana Tax Act also led to
removing marijuana from pharmacopeias because it was now considered
harmful, addictive, and cause disruptive mental behaviors.29 This was the
beginning of the fall of accessibility to medical marijuana.30
The 1960s marked an increase in the use of marijuana by youths,
resulting in President Richard Nixon’s appeal to Congress to pass rigorous
legislation to fight drug use in the country.31 In response, Congress passed
the CSA in 1970, which prohibited the possession, cultivation, and
distribution of marijuana.32 The CSA divided drugs into five schedules, and
marijuana was placed in Schedule I, a restrictive classification reserved for
drugs that have a high likelihood for abuse and no accepted medical use.33
There have been many efforts to reclassify marijuana under the CSA.
For example, in 1972, the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana
Legislation (“NORML”) argued that because marijuana is less harmful than
other medicines and therapeutic for many diseases, it should be reclassified
from Schedule I to Schedule II of the CSA.34 Unfortunately, this and all other
attempts have been unsuccessful.
The Supreme Court has also affirmed Congress’s power to regulate
marijuana under the Commerce Clause in the 2005 case of Gonzales v. Raich
(“Gonzales”).35 In Gonzales, the Court opined that it is illegal to use, sell, or
possess marijuana for medical use, even if the medical use complies with state
law.36 Thus, the federal classification of marijuana, regardless of whether for
medical or recreational use, is still a Schedule I substance under the CSA.37
27
Michael J. Aurit, Reefer Sadness: How Patients Will Suffer if Arizona Refuses to Implement Its Own
Medical Marijuana Law, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 543, 549 (2012); Kenneth Seligson, Note, A Job for Congress:
Medical Marijuana Patients’ Fight for Second Amendments Rights, 48 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 63, 72
(2018).
28
See Seilgson, supra note 27, at 72.
29
See Aurit, supra note 27 at 559; Seligson, supra note 27, at 72 n.70. Pharmacopeias are books that
list and describe drugs, usually defining their use and any effects. See Pharmacopeias, MERRIAMWEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pharmacopoeia (last visited dec. 2,
2020).
30
See Aurit, supra note 27, at 549.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.; MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE 16–17 (Jane E. Joy et al., eds.,
1999). “[A]s a schedule I narcotic . . . [marijuana] cannot be prescribed by any physician . . . [and] its
distribution or manufacture [i]s a serious felony.” Sam Kamin, Medical Marijuana in Colorado and the
Future of Marijuana Regulation in the United States, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 147, 152 (2012).
34
MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE, supra note 33, at 17.
35
See generally 545 U.S. 1 (2005). The Court’s ruling in Gonzales is consistent with its earlier
decision in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, which held that, under the CSA, the
balance had been reached “against a medical necessity exception” to the CSA’s prohibitions on marijuana.
See 532 U.S. 483, 499 (2001).
36
See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 27–30.
37
See Shu-Acquaye, supra note 5, at 128.
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Medical research surrounding the positive effects of marijuana, and
the continuing shift towards its social acceptance, opened the floodgates for
implementing programs that legalize medical marijuana use.38 As a result,
most states have passed medical marijuana laws to regulate its cultivation,
use, distribution, and the granting of licenses to patients wishing to buy
marijuana for medical use.39 Additionally, recreational marijuana has also
been approved in some states.40 This growth and expansion of the marijuana
industry is perhaps the needed impetus for regulation at both the state and
federal levels.
III. THE REGULATION OF MARIJUANA AS AN EVOLVING TREND
A. Federalization Proposal
In 2019 Representative Jerry Nadler and then-Senator Kamala Harris
introduced the Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement Act
(“MORE Act”), and it is considered “the most sweeping marijuana reform bill
ever . . . .”41 If passed, the MORE Act would remove marijuana from the
CSA, as well as promote reparative justice and equity within the industry.42
Under the MORE Act, several measures would be implemented. First,
marijuana would be rescheduled at the federal level; thus, the MORE Act
would allow states to enact their own policies without any federal government
intervention.43
Second, the MORE Act would implement several measures aimed at
repairing the deep-rooted injustices experienced by communities of color at
the hands of biased enforcement of drug laws. First among these measures

38

Id.
Id.
40
Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, DRUG POL’Y ALL., http://www.drugpolicy.org/issues/
marijuana-legalization-and-regulation (last visited Dec. 2, 2020). Eleven states and the District of
Columbia have now legalized marijuana for recreational use for adults over twenty-one. Id.
41
Id.; see Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement Act of 2019, S. 2227, 116th Cong.
(2019). Another bill aimed at decriminalizing marijuana was the Marijuana Justice Act of 2017, introduced
by Senator Cory Booker. See Marijuana Justice Act of 2017, S. 1689, 115th Cong. (2017). However, a
defect of the Marijuana Justice Act is that it failed to address some of racial and economic harms that have
plagued marijuana legislation and prohibitions. See Shu-Acquaye, supra note 5, at 145–47. A Harvard
article nicely summarized this point stating:
Racial inequality remains a pernicious reality of current legalization efforts around
the country. Black and Latino victims of the drug war are noticeably absent from
current legal marijuana markets. . . . After a long history of pervasive discrimination
in employment and education, Black and Latino Americans are far less likely to be
able to raise the money necessary to start a marijuana business.
Drug Policy—Marijuana Justice Act of 2017—Senator Cory Booker Introduces Act to Repair the Harms
Exacted by Marijuana Prohibition.—Marijuana Justice Act of 2017, S. 1689, 115th Cong., 131 HARV. L.
REV. 926, 931 (2018).
42
House Judiciary Chairman Jerry Nadler and Senator Kamala Harris Introduce Sweeping
Marijuana Reform Bill, DRUG POL’Y ALL. (July 23, 2019), https://www.drugpolicy.org/pressrelease/2019/07/house-judiciary-chairman-jerry-nadler-and-senator-kamala-harris-introduce.
43
Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, supra note 40.
39

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol46/iss1/3

2020]

Medical Marijuana

31

includes requiring that previous marijuana convictions be expunged.44 Next,
the MORE Act would make it possible for those convicted of marijuana
violations to petition for resentencing and expungement.45 In the same vein,
the MORE Act would require that immigrants are not deported or refused
citizenship because of a marijuana law violation.46 The MORE Act would
also require the adoption of legislation that “prevent[s] the government from
denying an individual federal benefits, student financial aid, or security
clearances needed to obtain government jobs because of marijuana use.”47
Finally, the MORE Act calls for the creation of a federal tax. The tax
would assist the communities and people who have suffered harm because of
marijuana prohibition by providing the funds for services like substance use
treatment, job training, and business licensing for cannabis.48 The goal of the
tax is to encourage people who have been “socially and economically
While marijuana
disadvantaged to enter the cannabis industry.”49
criminalization resulted in disparate enforcement and its ultimate negative
and disproportionate impact on minority communities, the trend is towards
advocating for social justice from revenue derived from the legalization of
marijuana in those communities.50
Although it is easy to think of the business opportunities that come
with legalization, one must remember that this industry is simply replacing
two things that were already in existence: an illicit market where many people
have made a livelihood and a system of prohibition that punished the same
thing that people are now able to get a license to do.51 Therefore, it is
imperative to consider whether the new marijuana industry’s structure repairs
the all the harms caused by marijuana laws of the past or simply prolongs
them.52
B. Social Justice as a Changing Trend
1. New York
The Drug Policy Alliance, a New York City non-profit organization,
does not believe that simply decriminalizing marijuana alone would be
44

Id.
House Judiciary Chairman Jerry Nadler and Senator Kamala Harris Introduce Sweeping
Marijuana Reform Bill, supra note 42.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, supra note 40.
49
House Judiciary Chairman Jerry Nadler and Senator Kamala Harris Introduce Sweeping
Marijuana Reform Bill, supra note 42.
50
Id.
51
Shaleen Title, How Insidious Laws are Keeping Many from Participating in the Promising Legal
Marijuana Economy, ALTERNET (July 6, 2016), http://www.alternet.org/2016/07/most-laws-barringpeople-felonies-marijuana-business-pure-hypocrisy.
52
Id.
45
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enough to right the wrongs of injustice in marijuana enforcement.53 Instead,
New York’s legalization campaign centers on racial and economic justice by
employing “smart regulation,” which is a type of regulation that supports and
strengthens communities that have been greatly affected by marijuana
criminalization while simultaneously ensuring a diverse and socially
equitable industry.54
Although New York decriminalized the possession of small amounts
of marijuana in 1977, more than 800,000 arrests have been made for low-level
marijuana possession have occurred over the last twenty years.55 Similar
arrests continue to happen even after a new marijuana decriminalization bill
was enacted in 2019.56 This buttresses the fact that more must be done beyond
decriminalization, especially given that the mere “alleged odor of marijuana
can still be used by law enforcement to justify a stop and search—even with
no concrete evidence.”57 In 2018, although youth twenty-five and younger
comprised only approximately 40% of the state population, they accounted
for 58% of all low-level marijuana arrests.58 In the first half of 2019, 75% of
those arrested for low-level marijuana offenses were Black and Latino, even
though they made up approximately a third of the state’s population.59
Those opposed to marijuana prohibition argue that criminalization
efforts have been ineffective and, in fact, misses out on the goal of cutting
back on marijuana use across New York.60 Instead, they say that prohibition
has been imprudent and promoted the expansion of an illegal industry.61 As
already stated, marijuana prohibition has been disproportionately enforced,
with almost 85% of annual arrests being people of color.62 For these
communities, marijuana criminalization and prohibition created a tense and
difficult relationship with law enforcement, especially given the tendency
towards invasive police presence in these communities.63 This resulted in a
“violent underground economy” that is difficult to govern, either by the rule

53
See Marijuana Reform in New York, DRUG POL’Y ALL., http://www.drugpolicy.org/new-york/
marijuana-reform (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
See DRUG POL’Y ALL., ENDING MARIJUANA PROHIBITION IN NEW YORK: SUMMARY OF THE
MARIJUANA REGULATION AND TAXATION ACT 1 (2017), http://smart-ny.com/wp-content/uploads/2017
/06/StartSMART_DPA_MRTA-Bill-Summary_09.14.2017.pdf.
61
Id.
62
Tyler McFadden, New York: The Marijuana Regulation and Taxation Act (MRTA), NORML (Mar.
18, 2019), http://blog.norml.org/2019/03/18/new-york-the-marijuana-regulation-and-taxation-act-mrta/;
see also DRUG POL’Y ALL., supra note 60, at 1.
63
Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, Advancing Racial Equity and Public Health: Smarter Marijuana Laws in
Western New York, CORNELL UNIV. ILR SCH., 6 (2017), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1352&context=buffalocommons.
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of law or regulation.64
In seeking to end marijuana prohibition, some New York legalization
groups are working to pass the Marijuana Regulation and Taxation Act
(“MRTA”).65 Consequently, the MRTA is intended to deal with the negative
impacts of the unsuccessful policy of marijuana prohibition by instead
forming a responsible and well-regulated industry that strengthens the state’s
economy and supports communities that have been most damaged by
marijuana prohibition.66
There are several potential justice enhancing benefits that would
result from passing the MRTA. First, the MRTA aims to promote social
justice. It is thought that legalizing marijuana would reduce low-level drug
arrests, which in itself would lower and positively impact the discrepancies in
the total arrest numbers, and communities of color would likely benefit from
the decriminalization, as it would be progress towards curtailing the racial
arrest numbers.67 What makes the MRTA even more attractive is that
previous convictions for marijuana crimes could be reduced or sealed.68
Second, the MRTA would promote community reinvestment. One
study found that, if regulated, the tax revenue from marijuana sales in New
York City alone could be over $400 million.69 This money can be used to
address projects in communities that have been the most harmed by the war
on drugs. For example, the MRTA allocated tax revenue as follows: 50%
would fund things like education, job training, and after school programs;
25% to drug treatment programs; and the remaining 25% to state programs
aimed at helping to address substance misuse by youths.70
Third, MRTA would positively impact public health and youth
access. As seen from data in other states, legalization and regulation tends to
deter and limit youth access to marijuana.71 For example, the MRTA would
prohibit marijuana sales near schools and youth centers, as well as ban

64

Id.
Id.
66
Id. at 7. The MRTA takes other steps to ensure racial justice. First the MRTA calls for “[c]reating
a micro-licensing structure, similar to New York’s rapidly growing craft wine and beer industry, which
allows small-scale production and sale plus delivery to reduce barriers to entry for people with less access
to capital and traditional avenues of financing.” McFadden, supra note 62. Second, the MRTA would
“[e]stablish[] the Community Grants Reinvestment Fund, which will invest in communities that have been
disproportionately impacted by the drug war through job training, economic empowerment, and youth
development programming.” Id. Finally, the MRTA would seek to “[e]nsur[e] diversity in New York’s
marijuana industry by removing barriers to access like capital requirements and building inclusivity by
allowing licensing to people with prior drug convictions. Only people with business-related convictions
(such as fraud or tax evasion) will be explicitly barred from receiving licenses.” Id.
67
Ó Súilleabháin, supra note 63, at 7.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 6.
65
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advertising to minors.72 Additionally, the MRTA requires that retail
businesses check IDs when making sales, and if they fail to adhere to this rule,
they may be required to forfeit their licenses.73 Although the MRTA failed to
pass in 2019, New York is on the path to restoring social justice and
strengthening marijuana laws and regulations.74 Activists are hopeful the
New York will set a precedent for others.75
2. New Mexico
Unlike in New York, New Mexico’s current marijuana policies are
characterized by prohibition, which is simply the absence of control and no
legal oversight.76 This invariably means that people of color and other
vulnerable populations who are more prone to involvement with marijuana
are more likely to be affected by the criminalization of marijuana.77
Nevertheless, 63% of New Mexico adults support the legalization and sale of
cannabis to adults older than twenty-one.78 Proponents for legalization
believe New Mexico needs to (1) address the collateral consequences of
marijuana criminalization; (2) come up with ways to create and encourage
inclusion and diversity within the industry; and (3) use any revenue generated
from legalization to “reinvest in communities that have been impacted by
prohibition.”79 Marijuana legalization is a positive pathway to prosperity for
New Mexico, given that can increase tax revenue, generate commerce, and
enhance agricultural economies.80
3. States Progressively Allocating Marijuana Revenues for Social
Good
As the wave for marijuana legalization is growing steadily across the
states, so too are the number of Americans in favor of legalization. Currently,
64% of Americans support marijuana legalization, and 62% reside in a state
that has legalized marijuana for medical use.81 The growth in support of
72

Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 7.
Anna Laffey, Lawmakers ‘Ran Out of Time’ to Legalize Marijuana in New York, CNN (June 19,
2019, 9:26 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/19/politics/new-york-marijuana-legalization-bill-fails/
index.html.
75
See As Marijuana Legalization Trend Continues, Social Equity Becomes a Key Question, COLO.
PUB. RADIO: NEWS (May 19, 2019), http://www.cpr.org/2019/05/19/as-marijuana-legalization-trendcontinues-social-equity-becomes-a-key-question/ (noting that New York is a leading state in the push for
legalizing marijuana on social equity grounds).
76
Grow New Mexico, DRUG POL’Y ALL., https://www.drugpolicy.org/new-mexico/campaigns/
marijuana-legalization (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
DRUG POL’Y ALL., FROM PROHIBITION TO PROGRESS: A STATUS REPORT ON MARIJUANA
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legalization is also seen in voting attitudes, as 75% of voters do not support
the federal government’s enforcement federal marijuana laws in states where
marijuana has been legalized for either medical or adult use.82
The pertinent question is whether, with this growth in legalization,
there is a concomitant measurable growth in social good from all the gains
resulting from state marijuana legalization. Regardless of what use the
revenue is put to, there appears to be a general drop in marijuana arrests and
court filings in jurisdictions that have legalized marijuana, resulting in saved
costs from enforcement and criminalization of thousands of people.83 For
example, in Alaska, marijuana-related arrests declined by 93% between 2013
and 2015; in Colorado, by 49% between 2012 and 2013; and in Oregon, by
96% between 2013 and 2016.84
Likewise, the number of marijuana court filings dropped by 81% in
Colorado between 2012 and 2015 and by 98% in Washington between 2011
and 2015.85 Additionally, in Washington, convictions for marijuana
possession declined by 76% between 2011 and 2015.86 The savings from the
decline in arrests and enforcement could be substantial because, as shown in
Washington, over $200 million was spent on marijuana-related arrests and
enforcement between 2000 and 2010.87
In the same vein, substantial tax revenue is generated from these
jurisdictions, and many use the money to offset the costs incurred by
regulatory agencies’ oversight of marijuana sales.88 The revenue is also used
to assist education and public health agencies by providing funds for
substance abuse treatment and drug use prevention programs.89
Some states’ statistics clearly reveal how revenues from marijuana
are put to social use and are worth examining. For example, schools are one
of biggest beneficiaries of revenue generated by legalized marijuana sales.
Since legalized marijuana sales began in January 2014, Colorado has
generated approximately $600 million in tax revenue from marijuana sales.90
Of that revenue, $230 million has been distributed to the Colorado
Department of Education to finance many school programs.91 Similarly,
Oregon designates 40% of its marijuana tax revenue to its state school fund,
82
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and Nevada’s projected two-year revenue of $56 million is also going to fund
state schools.92
Community repairment is another project that many states fund with
their marijuana tax revenue. For example, Alaska’s estimated annual $12
million is going to fund drug treatment programs and community residential
centers.93 Massachusetts and California use part of their tax revenue to repair
communities that have suffered the most from drug arrests and imprisonment,
substantially those communities devastated by racial drug enforcement.94
All of the programs mentioned above have resulted in job creation
and, therefore, enhanced the economy of the state.95 Early estimates suggest
that the legal marijuana market resulted in the creation of 165,000—230,000
jobs across the country, numbers that are likely to increase exponentially as
states continue to indulge in legalization and regulation.96
Ancillary benefits from marijuana legalization, as indicated by
evolving research, are correlated with reduced opioid overdose deaths and
opioid use disorder.97 For instance, in states that allow legal access to
medicinal marijuana, there has been a 25% reduction in overdose deaths
compared to states without legal access.98 After legalization in Colorado, an
examination of opioid overdose deaths showed a 0.7 death reduction per
month, as well as a downward trend of overdoses after 2014.99
Hence, while the benefits from legalization appear to be many and
varied, the question remains: How have these benefits been reflected in the
face of the business industry participants? Given the decades long practice
of marijuana prohibition and criminalization, with communities of color
bearing the brunt of the law, these individuals are stifled by their past and face
enormous challenges in the new world of legalization, including participating
and thriving in the marijuana industry.
IV. WHY LEGALIZATION DOES NOT SOLVE THE COLOR BIAS IN
THE MARIJUANA INDUSTRY
Despite the boom in the legalization of the medical and recreational
marijuana businesses, minorities are disproportionately prevented from
benefiting from this boom.100 White users and businesses, on the other hand,
92
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are reaping the benefits of legalization.101 This troubling irony and experience
in the post-legalization world where white people dominate the industry over
people of color, namely Blacks, is aptly reflected in the following statement
by Professor Michelle Alexander:
Here are white men poised to run big marijuana businesses,
dreaming of cashing in big—big money, big businesses
selling weed—after 40 years of impoverished black kids
getting prison time for selling weed, and their families and
futures destroyed. Now, white men are planning to get rich
doing precisely the same thing?102
Professor Alexander further underscores the point in her book, The New Jim
Crow, which explores how the “war on drugs has perpetuated the worst
aspects of racial segregation.”103 So, besides the racial disparity in law
enforcement and criminalization of marijuana, why the disparity and lack of
diversity in the cannabis market? Some factors that account for this disparity
are discussed in the following sections.
A. Clean Criminal Record Requirement for Marijuana Retailers
Many state marijuana laws have felony exclusion requirements which
prohibit those who have been convicted of certain crimes from entering the
marijuana business.104 The regulatory requirement that marijuana retailers
have a clean criminal record, apparently for security reasons, obviously
disproportionately impacts minorities who, as discussed previously, were
already disfavored by marijuana prohibition and other related crimes.105
In any other industry, years of work experience would normally
benefit a person searching for a job; however, that is not the case in the legal
marijuana market because favorable treatment or acceptance in this industry
depends, largely, on where you are from.106 Based on the disparities in
101
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Professor of L., Ohio State Univ. (Mar. 6, 2014)). Also aptly questioned by Tracy Jarett is the following:
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who are disproportionately affected by the war on drugs are not the ones benefiting from the economics of
legalization?” Tracy Jarrett, Six Reasons African Americans Aren’t Breaking Into Cannabis Industry, NBC
NEWS (Apr. 19, 2015, 8:29 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/6-reasons-african-americanscant-break-cannabis-industry-n344486.
103
See Morning Edition, The Legal Business of Marijuana Is Growing but the Industry Lacks Diversity,
NPR, at 1:27 (July 3, 2015, 5:06 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/07/03/419692413/the-legal-business-ofmarijuana-is-growing-but-the-industry-lacks-diversity; see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM
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ways that the war on drugs has been racially motivated).
104
Title, supra note 51.
105
Id.; Bender, The Colors of Cannabis, supra note 23, at 697; see also supra Part III.
106
Title, supra note 51.
102

Published by eCommons, 2020

38

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1

enforcement, if one is from a community that is over-policed, then they are
much more likely to have a drug conviction than someone from another
community who engages in the same action or behavior.107 Why should the
person with a conviction be precluded, while the person who was less likely
to be confronted by the police—and maybe more able to afford a lawyer—
have easier access to the marijuana business? Principles of fairness, justice,
and equity suggest that those who have already paid the price for the war on
drugs should not be punished even more. If indeed the belief is that exprisoners be given a second chance and opportunity to build a career, then
having a marijuana business should be treated like any other similar
business.108 Yet, most legalization laws do not wipe prior marijuana
convictions even though the conduct is now legal.109 Given that there is still
federal prohibition, the confusing and conflicting uncertainty between state
and federal laws makes vulnerable minorities even more uneasy about
exposing themselves to enforcement scrutiny.110 It is “undoubtedly unfair to
double-punish someone who has served their time” by withholding a business
license. Nevertheless, one would agree that if someone has committed certain
felonies, like embezzlement for example, that person could also fairly be
prohibited from owning a marijuana business.111
Marijuana exclusion laws vary from state to state, and looking at
some of the existing felony-exclusion laws, one can use them as “a starting
point to draft exclusion policies that [could] only apply to crimes that might
[justifiably] prevent a person from working in or owning a marijuana business
. . . .”112 This could be done while simultaneously minimizing
discrimination.113
In some states, crimes are considered for exclusion if they happened
within a certain period immediately preceding the application date.114 For
example, in Alaska, if someone has been found guilty of even a misdemeanor
involving a controlled substance, that person cannot apply for a retail license
for five years.115 However, in other states a marijuana-related conviction is a
completely bars a person from applying for a license. For instance, Colorado
107
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bars those with a felony conviction for a controlled substance from applying
for a medical dispensary license.116 Additionally, in some states, like Hawaii,
people convicted of a felony drug offense are prohibited from applying for a
medical marijuana dispensary license and are banned from working in any
capacity at marijuana dispensaries.117 Thus, those with records connected to
the war on drugs, have a tougher time applying for a license, as they are more
likely to be weeded out after scrutiny of their documents. This, again, greatly
impacts people of color and explains how regulation may be biased against
them, even if inadvertently.118
B. The Banking Conundrum for Marijuana Businesses
Due to the continuing illegality of marijuana on the federal level,
banks across the country are hesitant to accept money derived from marijuana
sales or offer banking services to marijuana businesses for fear of being shut
down by the federal government.119 According to longstanding federal law,
any bank that provides marijuana-related businesses with a checking account,
debit or credit card, a small business loan, or any other service could be found
guilty of money laundering or conspiracy.120 As a result, marijuana
entrepreneurs must self-fund or borrow money from their friends, family, or
other sources.121 This undoubtedly has a disparate effect on minorities, given
the inherent gaps in wealth, ownership, and credit building.122
Also, given the high costs involved in starting a marijuana business,
white people are more likely to obtain bank loans or be supported by wealthy
parents, who may previously have faulted their kids for smoking marijuana
but would not be reluctant in supporting a legitimate, legal, and potentially
profitable business endeavor.123 Given that most minorities cannot get loans
116
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or other startup money to enter the cannabis industry and that they have to
rely on other groups to give them money, that is where one can see the “subtle
but real barriers of entry for people of color.”124
C. The Application Process for a License
The application process for a marijuana dispensary license is not for
the faint of heart. In addition to the very high fees and costs associated with
applying for a license, the applicant should also be very savvy and
experienced in applying for government business licenses and dealing with
government regulators.125 The process is not “overwhelmingly transparent
and open,” nor easy to traverse.126 One needs not only to be politically
connected but must also understand how to navigate a politicized process. For
example, one must have formed great relationships with local politicians and
others who make the laws.127 If one cannot establish these relationships on
their own, they may have to pay a lobbyist to develop them—bringing the
conversation back to money, power, and influence.128 Given the history of
the war on drugs, one can only imagine what money and influence most of
these minorities would have had or established.
D. Business Location and Public Perceptions
According to Ethan Nadelmann, Director of the Drug Policy
Alliance, in many states that have legalized marijuana, there already is a
disproportionate number of Blacks, so this invariably affects the numbers
entering the marijuana industry.129 According to Nadelmann, marijuana
legalization in Southern states could change the industry’s demographics.130
For example, in Georgia, where there is a high population of middle-class
Black entrepreneurs, legalization may eventually result in a shift in the
124
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marijuana business demographics.131
Additional concerns that may also exacerbate minority participation
in the industry are the location of the business and the prevailing cultural bias
in the community. For example, to open and operate a successful dispensary
in any neighborhood, one has to get approval from community leaders.132
This may be even tougher if you have to navigate the business location with
church leaders, for instance. Nadelmann captured the issue when he stated:
“It could be that many African American business [people] live in a world
where the African American church is still quite strong and maybe there is a
concern about not being accepted by the community or letting other people
down, maybe there is a cultural resistance.”133 Consequently, the stigma
surrounding these same neighborhoods’ past is hard to overcome.
The same neighborhoods that were flooded with liquor stores are
likely to now be flooded by marijuana retail stores—the very thing these
communities have paid a price for in the war on drugs. The question that
should be presented to these leaders, and others in the community, should be
whether they really want these stores in their neighborhoods. No doubt, a
pastor in a gentrified neighborhood in Seattle’s Central District, where a
white-owned marijuana outlet—Uncle Ike’s pot shop—opened near a Black
church and teen’s center, would not appreciate the shop being in the area.134
Highlighting a seeming double standard, the pastor expressed his concern that
if a white-owned marijuana outlet is located at the same place where Black
people were often arrested for selling marijuana, then the mayor of Seattle has
to “let all the brothers and sisters go who are incarcerated for marijuana.”135
Protesters on the street chanted, “‘[n]o justice, no weed’ and ‘Uncle Ike’s has
got to go,’” further exhibiting the community’s frustration with the presence
of the pot shop.136
V. THE REGULATION OF MARIJUANA: THE EVOLVING TREND OF
VERTICAL INTEGRATION
For a horizontally integrated business, all parts of the process like
manufacturing, testing, and distribution are all regarded as distinct business
activities.137 By contrast, when a company controls every stage of its
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business, it is said to be vertically integrated.138 So, in cannabis parlance, a
company is vertically integrated when the different steps in the production of
cannabis are merged into one.139 For example, the growing, processing, and
distribution of cannabis can be placed into the hands of one company, thus
allowing that company to oversee every aspect of the manufacturing and
supply line.140 A vertically integrated cannabis company secures value
through total control of the production chain and, therefore, can maximize
efficiency and reliability.141 Vertically integrated programs are generally
licensed and regulated by state health departments or a comparable agency.142
There are advantages and disadvantages of vertical integration in the cannabis
industry, both discussed in the following sections.
A. Advantages of Vertical Integration
There are several advantages to vertical integration. First, vertical
integration allows for superior control over the product’s quality because
businesses are in a better position to adjust production and supply based on
changing market conditions.143 Second, vertical integration could be good for
the state because it can control the marijuana licenses in operation, and
therefore regulate the supply from the “seed to sale.”144 Third, because a
vertically integrated company’s supply is free from third parties, operating is
less expensive than it would otherwise be and reduces potential liability from
such third parties.145 Fourth, vertical integration enables internal cost savings
for cannabis companies through lower transaction costs and increased product
reliability.146 Fifth, vertically integrated businesses tend to be more
responsive to consumer needs and can quickly take advantage of market
trends.147 Sixth, a vertically integrated company can easily leverage
economies of scale.148 Seventh, vertically integrated businesses enjoy
assurance in their transactions.149 This means that producers can confident
that there is a market for their product, and end-users can count on a constant
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flow of that product.150 Finally, proponents of vertical integration say that
vertically integrated businesses can avoid some federal tax problems because
marijuana businesses are not allowed to deduct regular business expenses
under section 280E of the Federal Income Tax Code.151 Consequently, this
could result in cost savings that could translate to lower prices and maximum
profits.152
B. Disadvantages of Vertical Integration
Despite the many advantages of vertical integration, it not without its
disadvantages. First, given the necessity to bring multiple business
together—or the need to create a second or third branch of an existing
business—so that only one business controls the operation, vertical
integration requires huge initial capital. 153 Second, vertical integration may
require less flexibility and increased cost to manage and have the necessary
oversight to operate the enlarged business.154 Finally, opponents of vertical
integration argue it is harmful to the cannabis industry and the consumer
because it generates marijuana monopolies, suppresses the market, results in
lower product quality, and, more importantly, is an impediment to small
business owners.155 However, if a company has the capital and organizational
skills to bring it to fruition, vertical integration could be paramount to
dominance in the cannabis industry.156
C. Types of Vertical Integration
States employ a variety of regulations and license structures and each
one is unique. Although regulating the marijuana industry is still a relatively
new phenomenon, these regulations could enlighten and clarify their likely
impact, as their effectiveness over the years would be tested only after
sufficient evidence has been gathered.157 Vertical integration generally falls
under three categories: allowed, required, and prohibited.158
150
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1. Required Vertical Integration
Where states require vertical integration, only vertically integrated
businesses may apply for a state license, which would allow for the business
to engage in manufacturing, processing, and distribution activities.159 Third
party manufacturing or cultivation is strictly prohibited in these states.160
States that require vertical integration require that a minimum percentage of
business functions be performed by one entity before the business can be
considered a “vertically integrated marijuana business.”161 For example,
Colorado’s 70/30 rule requires that retailers grow a minimum of 70% of their
retail products.162 However, starting in July 2018, Colorado began to phase
out the 70/30 rule and, as of July 1, 2019, vertical integration was no longer
required for medical marijuana.163 Thus, this change is helpful to cultivators
who can now concentrate on growing the utmost quality of cannabis without
the pressure of handling processing and retailing operations.164
2. Allowed Vertical Integration
States like Nevada and Oregon allow—but do not require—vertical
integration, and therefore are said to provide the utmost economic freedom in
the industry.165 That is, once producers and processors have the proper state
license, they have the option to sell their own products or act as
wholesalers.166 In Nevada, for example, vertically integrated businesses can
have up to three license types: a cultivation, production, or retail license.167
Therefore, it would be legal for a cultivator, who decides to get a production
license, to infuse marijuana products and sell to retailers at a wholesale
price.168
3. Limited or Prohibited Vertical Integration
Limited or prohibited vertical integration is prevalent in California,
Washington, and Illinois.169 Under this regulatory standard, states separate
the production and retail aspects of the marijuana process.170 So, businesses
159
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operating in these states are allowed restricted vertical integration, although
increasingly, states with clear prohibitions against vertical integration are
trying to get away from any permissive vertical integration.171 Looking at
Washington and California, they permit business owners to hold two types of
licenses: a manufacturer/producer and a processor license.172 However, these
licensees are not allowed to have any interest, direct or indirect, in any retail
business.173 This is exemplified in a Washington statute which bars licensed
marijuana producers and processors from having any financial interest, direct
or indirect, in a licensed marijuana retailer.174
All these different types of marijuana business regulation models
have advantages and risks. However, marijuana business owners and
investors must understand the pros and cons of vertical integration in their
respective states, especially since it could take years to gather enough
evidence to determine whether vertical integration is indeed effective.175
VI. THE REGULATION OF MARIJUANA AS AN EVOLVING TREND:
THE CASE OF FLORIDA
A. Historical Background
In Florida, marijuana policy reforms started in 1978 when the Florida
legislature passed the Therapeutic Research Program, which never became
effective and was repealed in 1984.176 The program’s purpose was to provide
marijuana to cancer and glaucoma patients.177 Florida courts also started to
consider marijuana for its health benefits in the early 1990s. In 1991, the First
District Court of Appeals held in Jenks v. State that patients with HIV/AIDS
had successfully raised the medical necessity defense in response to marijuana
cultivation and paraphernalia charges.178 In 1998, the First District Court of
Appeals again upheld the medical necessity defense in Sowell v. State.179
These early state actions regarding the use of medical marijuana set the stage
for legislative advancement in the 2000s.
In 2012, the first bills proposing a constitutional amendment to allow
medical marijuana were introduced.180 In 2014, the Compassionate Medical
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Cannabis Act (“Medical Cannabis Act”) was passed, which permitted
physicians to prescribe low-THC cannabis to some patients.181 The Medical
Cannabis Act required the Florida Department of Health (“DOH”) to establish
a patient registry and gave them the ability to approve five organizations to
grow and distribute cannabis.182 Although proponents of a constitutional
amendment were successful in getting the Medical Cannabis Act on the 2014
ballot, it failed to pass, only receiving about 57% instead of the required 60%
vote.183
Fortunately, in 2016, Amendment 2 passed with 71% of the vote and
established a medical marijuana program, thus changing the landscape of
medical marijuana in Florida State.184 In 2017, during a special legislative
session, Senate Bill 8A was passed to implement Amendment 2.185
The Florida Constitution, as amended in the 2016, refers to marijuana
dispensaries as “medical marijuana treatment centers” which are defined to
mean any “entity that acquires, cultivates, possesses, processes . . . transports,
sells, distributes, dispenses, or administers” medical cannabis.186 However,
the implementing legislation defined treatment centers as entities that
“cultivate, process, transport, and dispense medical marijuana.”187 The
statute’s use of the word “and” instead of “or” appears to violate the
constitutional amendment, as it seems to require marijuana businesses to
vertically integrate, where the constitution does not.188 Consequently, a case
was filed by the Florigrown Company (“Florigrown”) who argued that
requiring Florida treatment centers to be vertically integrated is in direct
conflict with the state constitution.189 Examining the case would be
illuminating.
B. The Case of Florida Department of Health v. Florigrown, LLC
Two weeks after the constitutional amendment went into effect,
Florigrown sent a letter to the DOH requesting registration as a medical
marijuana treatment center (“MMTC”).190 The request was denied.191 In June
2017, the governor signed a bill which set the statutory framework regarding
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MMTC registration.192 In response, Florigrown filed a lawsuit requesting a
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.193 Specifically, Florigrown
argued that these statutory provisions were unconstitutional and again
requested to be registered as an MMTC by the DOH.194
The trial court initially denied injunctive relief finding that, although
Florigrown had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, they “could
not prove irreparable harm or that a temporary injunction would be in the
public’s best interests.”195 Three months later, Florigrown filed a request for
another temporary injunction.196 This time, the trial court granted the motion
finding that the DOH’s “unwillingness to [create] rules for registering
MMTCs” in accordance with the constitutional amendment required a
different result.197
On appeal, the DOH challenged the trial court’s decision to enter the
temporary injunction.198 There, the court affirmed the principle that the
legislature may not enact a statute that will restrict a right granted under the
constitution.199 In its analysis, the court found that the statute required
licenses to be vertically integrated; yet, the constitutional amendment did
not.200 Specifically, the court noted that while vertical integration requires a
licensee to perform all aspects related to the production and sale of marijuana,
the constitutional amendment permits MMTCs to perform any—but not
necessarily all—of the activities authorized by the amendment.201 As a result,
the court found the language of the statute to be in conflict with the
constitutional amendment, and upheld the injunction.202 The court’s decision
required the DOH to at least consider Florigrown’s application and to register
MMTCs without abiding by the unconstitutional statutory provisions.203
C. The Status of Vertical Integration in Florida
The Court of Appeals determined that the vertically integrated model
presented in the statute was unconstitutional because it restricts licenses and
permits a select number of companies to have a monopoly on the marijuana
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supply chain.204 That is, these companies must cultivate, process, package,
and sell medical marijuana without inviting other businesses to deal with the
different aspects of the marijuana path.205
The appellate court’s crucial decision raised important questions
about the current structure for regulating medical marijuana licenses and if it
will remain intact.206 After the ruling, there was speculation that Florida will
wind up with a hybrid system of vertical licenses “that will grandfather in the
existing [twenty-two] vertical licenses.”207 If the state does develop a hybrid
system, it will have to issue cultivation and dispensary permits.208 It is also
suggested that the legislature may also have to embrace horizontal licenses,
while avoiding product diversion.209 However, Florida policymakers have
historically disfavored a marketplace where many companies partake in the
product-making from seed to sale.210 Thus, should the state indulge in
horizontal licenses, they would likely be restrictive and highly regulated.211
Ultimately, state officials believe the appellate court’s ruling in Florigrown
infused confusion and uncertainty into Florida’s medical marijuana
industry.212
The DOH appealed the appellate court’s ruling to the Florida
Supreme Court, confirming speculation that Florgirown would conclude in
the state’s highest court.213 In May 2020, the Florida Supreme Court heard
arguments, but in an unusual and extraordinary move it “ordered a new round
of arguments based on whether the statute equates to an unconstitutional
‘special law.’”214 This diagnosis as a special law is even more paramount,
given that the Florida Constitution generally bars “special” laws, which are
laws that are intended to benefit specific entities.215 That is, a special law
tends to unfairly favor a particular category of businesses.
Hence the crux of the matter is whether under the vertical integration
204
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model as propounded under the 2017 legislation grants rights to particular
companies but not to other companies, generally.216 The argument made by
DOH counsel was that the 2017 law permits “applicants that meet certain
criteria to vie for highly coveted medical-marijuana licenses.”217 The DOH
contends that the law permits certain classes of businesses to receive
particular treatment, not just specific businesses.218 Simply put, the DOH’s
argument is that the law is not a special law but a general one that applies to
all.219 However, this argument was rebutted by counsel for Florigrown, who
denounced the practice established in the statute as one that limits the free
market, creates a monopoly for a few entities, and is inappropriate and
arbitrary.220 Florigrown contends that the statute is obviously a special law,
and not a general one, as it results in a different treatment of any company
that was not already in possession of a license and seeking to obtain one.221
Consequently, even though Florigrown paid the licensing application fees, it
was not granted a license but rather placed on a wait list with other
companies.222 In fact, Florigrown, in spite of all its efforts, to this day has not
been able to get an approval to legally operate its marijuana business in
Florida.223
The Florigrown case highlights some important issues presented in
the competitive medical marijuana market as a whole and in Florida in
particular, where licenses have been granted for the cost of over $50 million.
The outcome of the case is awaited by many prospective medical marijuana
licensees who would like to have a share of the Florida pie, since a favorable
outcome to Florigrown would signal a possible access to one of the country’s
most lucrative marijuana markets.224 More importantly, a final decision by
the Florida Supreme Court may ultimately end up with the DOH formulating
new rules or revising its current rules pertaining to the application for
licensees for additional MMTCs.225
Lawsuits, like Florigrown, regarding licenses are not uncommon in
Florida. When initially awarding marijuana licenses, the government divided
the states into five districts, and the winner of the license was the applicant
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who scored highest in each district.226 The first round of applicants resulted
in fourteen vertically integrated licenses.227 Based on these application
scores, however, only five of the recipients were granted the licenses, while
the remaining nine had to get theirs through litigation with the state and DOH,
raising issues such as discrimination and arbitrary scoring procedures, among
others.228 As a result of, and compounded by, the uproar of Floridians seeking
improved access to medical marijuana licenses, the DOH has either settled or
lost these nine suits.229
VII. WHAT LIES AHEAD FOR THE MARIJUANA INDUSTRY?
The future of the marijuana industry cannot be comprehensively
analyzed without addressing the issue of conflicting state and federal law. As
discussed in this Article, under federal law, the possession, cultivation, and
distribution of marijuana is still illegal, and to date the Supreme Court has
dismissed any doubt about the constitutionality of the ban.230 Since state law
is preempted by federal law, the federal government can always enforce its
law as it has done: by finding state law illegal.231 However, the states continue
to exercise both “de jure and de facto power to legalize medical marijuana in
the CSA’s shadow.”232 One may categorize state marijuana programs as any
of the following: “(1) preempted, and thus unenforceable, (2) enforceable but
impotent, or (more rarely) (3) unencumbered by federal law.”233 None of
these analyses have satisfactorily proven state authority, as they are rather
wanting and unpersuasive.234
Despite federal preemption concerns, recreational marijuana is the
new wave in the marijuana industry. The District of Columbia and eleven
states—Alaska, California, Colorado, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington—have passed
expansive laws legalizing marijuana for recreational use for adults who are
twenty-one or older.235 Other states are working towards this, and so it is the
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continuing wave in the marijuana industry.236 The question now is not
whether to legalize marijuana, but how? The federal government should
come to terms with the “impracticability of fighting [this] war against
marijuana” enforcement and instead use social scientific evidence to regulate
marijuana in ways that are safe yet controlled.237
Voters across the country are vehemently denouncing a federal
marijuana policy that they believe has failed the war on drugs and undermines
or denies the scientific evidence that does exist.238 As shown in this Article,
voters are eliminating state and local penalties for both medical and
recreational use.239 Criminalizing conduct that thirty-three states and 64% of
the American people believe should be legal only tends to “undermine the
people’s faith in the law and the government.”240 As a result, the law loses its
purpose, power, and authority over the majority of the population because
they refuse to conform to it.241
Marijuana legalization is at its peak in this country, which is
supported by anecdotal evidence showing that marijuana use is extensive in
many different aspects of American life.242 Yet, the federal position of
prohibition does not appear to want to embrace any change. Although the
enforcement pattern of the federal government has been up and down, the
bottom line remains—for over the past seventy-five years, marijuana remains
a federally prohibited drug.243 No doubt, commentators suggest, and
rightfully so, that it is time for the federal government to choose between
blocking state laws that legalize marijuana or allowing them to be executed
without federal interference.244 The overlapping of state and federal law is
untenable, as it makes no sense that an industry employing tens of thousands
of people—and generating hundreds of millions in revenue—is erected on
illegal transactions for which people could be imprisoned for many, many
years.
Scholars have suggested that the federal prohibition is inconsistent
with the desire to regulate because one can only regulate that which is legal.245
Thus if analogized to alcohol, which is legal and, therefore, regulated, that
would offer a template that could be used for marijuana legalization as well.246
236

Id.
See Gene Taras, Note, High Time for Change: How Legalizing Marijuana Could Help Narrow the
Racial Divide in the United States, 24 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 565, 598 (2016).
238
Todd, supra note 88, at 103.
239
Id.
240
Id. at 103–04; Struyk, supra note 2.
241
Todd, supra note 88, at 103–04.
242
Kamin, supra note 33, at 166.
243
Id.
244
See Alex Kreit, The Federal Response to State Marijuana Legalization: Room for Compromise, 91
OR. L. REV. 1029, 1040 (2013).
245
See Steven B. Duke, The Future of Marijuana in the United States, 91 OR. L. REV. 1301, 1308
(2013).
246
Id.
237

Published by eCommons, 2020

52

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1

Under this governing model, the federal government would rescind the ban
on the possession and distribution of marijuana, while at the same time
maintaining some restrictions against interstate commerce, like in unlicensed
and mislabeled drugs.247 The federal government could then participate
alongside the state in taxing the manufacturer and distributor of the goods.248
Other regulations would be left in the hands of the states.249 For example, “a
state could decide to leave the drug distribution to a state institution; other
states would license production and distribution to either private individuals
or institutions.”250 And just like restrictions that apply to alcohol, states
control where distribution and consumption can take place.251 States would
then impose the necessary sanctions against misappropriating the drug to
minors, including possible revocation of license and criminal sanctions under
certain circumstances.252 So, if marijuana is to be regulated like alcohol,
“controls [could] be placed on such factors as quality, potency, amount
purchased, time and place of sales, age of buyers, etc.”253 Such regulations
would prove valuable to the consumer as they would provide safe, goodquality potency, which would be more valuable than prohibited drugs.254
VIII. CONCLUSION
Marijuana legalization is still ongoing. Most states allow for limited
use of medical marijuana under certain circumstances, while several states
have also decriminalized the possession of small amounts of marijuana.255
The pertinent question is whether, with this growth in legalization,
there is a concomitant measurable growth in social good from all the gains
resulting from state marijuana legalization. Minority communities that have
historically suffered and been hampered by the war on drugs are at least a part
of the booming new marijuana trend through programs that address their
community needs. The results from legalization are reassuring, so much so
that even elected officials who initially opposed the idea are now in favor of
legalization.256 As this Article demonstrates, there is a general trend towards
social justice from tax revenue, but there remains the problem of diversity
bias in the industry post-legalization.
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State regulatory requirements are some of the impediments to entry
into the market for people of color. Therefore, there is an urgent need to
highlight and prioritize policies that would repair the unequal and
discriminatory harms inflicted by marijuana criminalization and enforcement.
This should include regulations that reduce or even eliminate barriers that
preclude total participation by all.
The states’ regulations of marijuana through vertical integration fall
into three categories: required, allowed, and prohibited.257 The different
types of marijuana business regulation models come with advantages and
disadvantages. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the marijuana business
owners and investors to understand the pros and cons of vertical integration
in their respective states.258 This is even more crucial because it could take
years to gather enough evidence to demonstrate insight into whether vertical
integration is indeed effective in protecting, promoting, and predicting the
regulation of the marijuana industry.
The ongoing conflict between state and federal laws in marijuana
legalization is still a fundamental issue to be resolved. Some states in an
attempt to find a solution to this state-federal conflict, have rescheduled
marijuana under their state laws as a Schedule II drug.259 However,
practically speaking, this does not resolve the issue, because state schedules
are superseded by federal schedules, which do not permit marijuana
prescriptions.260 Thus, the final say in addressing this matter remains with
Congress; it should resolve this impasse once and for all. Some of the
proposed bills are a step in the right direction, but Congress must act—take
the bull by the horns and bring finality to this state and federal conflict.
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